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THE U.K. SUPREME COURT AT WAR 
 
Po Jen Yap † 
 
Abstract: This article contends that the underlying normative assumptions of civil 
libertarians and national security “executive unilateralists” are premised on a variant of 
the “nirvana fallacy.”  In other words, civil libertarians generate a best-case scenario for 
rigorous judicial oversight over executive action during emergencies and compare it to 
the worst-case scenario for executive action; the reverse holds true for executive 
unilateralists.  In practice, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has been cognizant 
of the institutional advantages and limitations of its office when it adjudicates national 
security disputes, and has not succumbed to the criticisms of scholars in either camp.  
Instead, since the September 11th terrorist attacks, there has been a strong correlation 
between the degree of judicial deference displayed to the executive on national security 
matters and the information made available to the Court.  In other words, the intensity of 
the judicial oversight of various counter-terrorism measures increases when an 
emergency wanes and the Court receives credible information that the impugned 
governmental measures are ineffective or unnecessary in addressing the perceived 
national security threats. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks (“9/11”) and 
similar tragedies across the globe, governments around the world have 
responded by passing a slew of legislative sanctions that seek to combat this 
global national security threat.1  The United Kingdom’s government, like 
many of its foreign counterparts, has frequently contended that, in times of 
national crisis, democracies must recalibrate their institutional processes and 
reinterpret their legal norms to accept more intrusive encroachments on 
personal liberty that would usually be considered unacceptable during 
“normal” times.2  The British judiciary, in particular the Supreme Court (and 
the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords), has also entered the fray as 
they are tasked to review and rule on the legality of several contentious 
governmental measures.3  However, as these judges sit at trial, they too also 
                                                      
† LL.B. (NUS); LL.M. (Harvard); LL.M. (London) Ph.D. (Cambridge); Associate Professor, 
University of Hong Kong.  The author would like to thank Cora Chan and Mark Tushnet for all their 
insightful comments.  All errors are the author’s own.  
1  See generally KENT ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT: COMPARATIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM (Cambridge 
2011).  
2  See id. at 241-44. 
3  See A & Ors v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 
(H.L.); A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2), [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221 
(H.L.); Gillan, R v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis & Anor, [2006] UKHL 12, [2006] 2 A.C. 
307 (H.L.); Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45, [2008] 1 A.C. 385 (H.L.); 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. E, [2007] UKHL 47, [2008] 1 A.C. 499 (H.L.); Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v. AF, [2009] UKHL 28, [2010] 2 A.C. 269 (H.L.). 
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stand trial4 when their decisions are judged in the court of public opinion and 
are critiqued within the walls of academia. 
 Unsurprisingly, commentators have published a plethora of academic 
literature on how courts should address these legal challenges against 
governmental counter-terrorism efforts. 5   However, this discourse on 
national security has been dominated by the assertions of two polarized 
factions.  On one side, we have the “executive unilateralists”6 who argue that 
courts—especially during emergencies or periods of crisis—should 
generally defer to governmental determinations on national security.7  These 
scholars contend that delay and uncertainty would result from the judicial 
review of national security disputes and impose unacceptable costs on 
executive power.  Furthermore, “judicial deference is both desirable and 
predictable, given the high stakes and the judges’ limited information and 
competence.”8  On the other side, we have the civil libertarians who insist 
that judges should never acquiesce to governmental intrusions on human 
rights, even in times of public emergencies, and that courts must be vigilant 
and provide robust oversight over state action at all times.9  They believe 
that public bodies tend to overreact and that “the government’s own 
assessment may be colored by fear of the electoral response and—less 
charitably—by calculations of electoral advantage,”10 such that it is vital for 
the courts to subject the assertions of the executive to “searching 
examination.”11 
A central purpose of this article is to show why both opposing, 
strident views are normatively untenable and unsustainable, and why it is 
unsurprising that neither viewpoint has been accepted in practice by the 
                                                      
4  See Aharon Barak, Some Reflections on the Israeli Legal System and Its Judiciary, 6.1 
ELECTRONIC J. OF COMP. L. (2002), http://ejcl.org/61/art61-1.html. 
5  See Fiona de Londras & Fergal F. Davis, Controlling the Executive in Times of Terrorism: 
Competing Perspectives on Effective Oversight Mechanisms, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 19 (2010); David 
Feldman, Human Rights, Terrorism and Risk: The Role of Politicians and Judges, PUB. L. 364 (2006); 
Allen Kavanagh, Judging the Judges under the Human Rights Act: Deference, Disillusionment and the 
‘War on Terror’, PUB. L. 287 (2009). 
6  See Samuel Issacharoff & R. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: 
An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2004). 
7  See John Finnis, Nationality, Alienage and Constitutional Principle (University of Oxford Faculty 
of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08, 2008); David Campbell, The Threat of 
Terror and the Plausibility of Positivism, PUB. L. 501 (2009). 
8  ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE 
COURTS 91 (2007).   
9  See Feldman, supra note 5; FIONA DE LONDRAS, DETENTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR: CAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS FIGHT BACK? (2011); Cora Chan, Proportionality and Invariable Baseline Intensity of 
Review, 33(1) LEGAL STUD. 1 (2013). 
10  E. Metcalfe, Terror, Reason and Rights, in CIVIL LIBERTIES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND PROSPECTS 
FOR CONSENSUS 178 (E. Reed and M. Dumper eds., 2012).   
11  See Feldman, supra note 5, at 379. 
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House of Lords and its succeeding body, the Supreme Court (hereinafter 
referred to collectively as “the Court”) in the post-9/11 cases.  It is my 
contention that the underlying normative assumptions of scholars in both 
camps are premised on a variant of the “nirvana fallacy.”  Civil libertarians 
generate a best-case scenario for rigorous judicial oversight of executive 
action during emergencies and compare it to the worst-case scenario for 
executive action, while the reverse holds true for executive unilateralists.  
Realistically, judges on the Court are insulated from the political winds and 
are arguably more impartial in reviewing challenges to governmental action.  
However, they are comparatively more limited in their access to the requisite 
national security information and lack the training to make the predictive 
risk assessments on the necessity of national security measures.  On the 
other hand, while it is equally true that, in times of crisis, the executive 
branch possesses the “speed, secrecy, flexibility, and efficiency that no other 
governmental institution can match,”12 the need to assuage public fear and 
moral panics may distort the objectivity of the executive’s assessments.  The 
main trade-off in the institutional design of security policy is between 
freedom from bias and information.13 
This article contends that the Court has been generally cognizant of 
the institutional advantages and limitations of its office when adjudicating 
national security disputes, and has not succumbed to criticisms.  Instead, 
there has been an inverse correlation between the degree of judicial 
deference displayed to the executive on national security matters and the 
information made available to the Court since 9/11.  In other words, the 
intensity of the judicial oversight over various counter-terrorism measures 
increases when an emergency wanes, and the Court receives credible 
information that the impugned governmental measures are ineffective or 
unnecessary in addressing the perceived national security threats.  As time 
passes, the Court often acquires more information, thereby narrowing the 
epistemic gap between the judges and the executive.  Conversely, where the 
Court was not privy to the intelligence on which executive anticipatory risk-
assessments were based, and where the costs of judicial errors were 
particularly high, the judiciary generally erred on the side of caution and 
deferred to the executive’s national security determinations. 
This article’s central argument is that there exists an inverse 
relationship between the amount of information the Court has, and the level 
of judicial deference it affords the government.  While many civil 
                                                      
12 See HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 119 (1990).     
13  ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 86 (2008). 
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libertarians such as Fiona de Londras,14 Fionnuala Ni Aoláin, and Oren 
Gross15 have also argued for a “sliding scale” of judicial deference, their 
arguments are premised solely on rights-based concerns: the judicial review 
of state action must become more rigorous over time because of the adverse 
impact on the individual, as the length of his or her rights-deprivation 
increases.16  This article’s argument is different and novel so far as it 
explains and justifies this inverse relationship between time and judicial 
deference on informational grounds. 
This article will focus only on the case law of the Court and the 
judicial approach it adopts vis-à-vis national security.  While Adam Tomkins 
has published an illuminating article on how courts at first instance have 
scrutinized national security determinations by the government more 
intensely than the Court has,17 this article argues that the more activist stance 
taken by the lower courts should not affect how the Court behaves.  These 
courts of first instance—i.e., the Administrative Court, the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”), and the Proscribed 
Organisations Appeal Commission—are all specialized tribunals, while the 
Court is a generalist one.18  Specialist judges who routinely deal with 
national security issues would naturally build up a considerable body of 
experience and expertise in the area, and they would—over time—become 
very seasoned at assessing the credibility of the State’s national security 
claims.19  Judges on the Court generally do not have such security expertise 
or specialized on-job training, and deference is thus a rational response to 
these epistemic conditions of uncertainty associated with such adjudication.  
Furthermore, courts of first instance have the “luxury” of having their errors 
corrected by the appellate courts, whereas the Court shoulders the burden of 
having the last (judicial) word.  If aggressive judicial review, which hampers 
counter-terrorism efforts, can (rightly or wrongly) incur the government’s 
wrath or public outrage, then prudential constraints may counsel the Court’s 
                                                      
14  See Fiona de Londras, Can Counter-terrorist Internment Ever be Legitimate?, 33 HUM. RTS. Q. 
593 (2011). 
15  See Fionnuala Ni Aoláin and Oren Gross, A Skeptical View of Deference to the Executive in Times 
of Crisis, 41 ISR. L. REV. 545 (2008). 
16  See de Londras, supra note 14, at 596; Aoláin and Gross, supra note 15, at 559. 
17  See Adam Tomkins, National Security and the Role of Court: A Changed Landscape?, L. Q. REV. 
543 (2010). 
18  Id. at 545. 
19  One may note that for the SIAC, in particular, an expert on security matters would usually be 
a member of the panel.  See Appeal to the Special Immigr. Appeals Comm’n, HM COURTS & TRIBUNAL 
SERV. (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.justice.gov.uk/tribunals/special-immigration-appeals-commission. 
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judicial restraint.20  This is so because the Court always bears the ultimate 
responsibility for any unintended consequences of judicial mistakes. 
Part II of this article begins with an examination of the case for 
judicial deference as advanced by renowned executive unilateralists such as 
John Yoo,21 Eric Posner,22 and Adrian Vermeule.23  In addition, Part II 
explores the normative arguments in favor of robust judicial review over 
national security matters, as commonly advanced by eminent civil 
libertarians such as David Feldman24 and Fiona de Londras.25  The aim in 
Part II is to explain how scholars in both camps have viewed their preferred 
public institution through rose-tinted glasses, as they only see the 
institutional advantages that their preferred institution enjoys in national 
security determinations, while failing to account for the institutional 
disadvantages inherent in the office.  Next, in Part III, this article illustrates 
and elaborates on how, since 9/11, the Court has sought to mediate the 
polarized demands of the executive unilateralists and the civil libertarians by 
increasing the level of judicial scrutiny over state action as it acquires more 
information over time. 
II. THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLARITY: EXECUTIVE UNILATERALISM AND 
CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM  
Professor John Yoo is a strident executive unilateralist.26  Central to 
the case for judicial deference in times of national emergencies is his 
argument that the judiciary is ill-equipped to acquire, investigate, and 
process information on national security.  As he observes:  
The executive branch, by contrast, can collect information 
through agency experts, a national and global network of 
officials and agents, and connections with outside groups and 
foreign governments . . . . Courts do not operate the broad 
network of information sources that is available to the executive 
branch, nor can it benefit from the informal methods of 
information collection the legislature has at its disposal.27 
                                                      
20  See A. Kavanagh, Deference or Defiance? The Limits of the Judicial Role in Constitutional Role 
in Adjudication, in EXPOUNDING THE CONSTITUTION 209 (Grant Huscroft ed., 2008). 
21  See J. Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573 (2006). 
22  See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 8.   
23  See id. 
24  See Feldman, supra note 5.  
25  See DE LONDRAS, supra note 9.   
26  See Yoo, supra note 21. 
27  Id. at 593. 
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Furthermore, once the judiciary has made a decision based on the 
information available to it at a given time, it generally cannot reverse 
itself—until another case raising the same issue arises again—even if the 
additional information would lead the court to change its mind.28  If the 
disputed decision is from a court of final resort, it may be years before this 
new information can be addressed by that same body.  In the meantime, the 
executive would be hamstrung by this delay, and time is of the essence when 
the government is seeking to combat threats to national security. 
In the same vein, Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have 
emphasized the informational deficits from which the courts suffer.29  More 
significantly, however, they attempt to eviscerate the arguments oft-
advanced by civil libertarians that, during emergencies, governments tend to 
panic and exaggerate the severity of national security threats, and inflict the 
costs of increased security measures on unpopular minorities.30  Not only do 
these learned scholars disbelieve that unpopular minorities would be subject 
to “scapegoating” during emergencies, they actually argue that emergencies 
would enhance the political position of these minorities: “[B]ecause 
emergencies capture the attention of the public, it will be more difficult for 
the government to conceal oppressive or redistributive policies, making it 
easier to mobilise opposition to such policies.”31 
More incredulously, these scholars present a rosy picture of why 
states would not engage in greater discrimination against foreigners during 
periods of emergencies.  In such an event, the voting majority would want 
foreigners to come to its country and contribute to its economy and 
workforce, and the good treatment of one’s nationals abroad is dependent on 
each state extending due process to aliens on its own soil.32   
Firstly, one must note that the question of whether the political status 
of weak or unpopular minorities is actually enhanced during emergencies is 
an empirical one, for which the authors have conceded that they provide no 
such evidence.33 
Secondly, while the authors’ conjectures are not patently false, they 
are undeniably viewing state action through rose-tinted glasses.  More 
plausible and realistic are scenarios where, in times of crisis, fear prevails 
and emotions run high.  In such times, the general public is willing to 
condone immeasurably more draconian measures, especially if the 
                                                      
28  See id. 
29  See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 8, at 31. 
30  See id. at 87. 
31  Id. at 110-11. 
32  Id. at 125. 
33  Id. at 32. 
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externalities of such measures are only foisted upon unpopular segments of 
society perceived to be responsible for the crisis.  In times of emergencies, 
governments have every incentive to overreact, for the general public would 
be comparatively less forgiving if another terrorist attack were to occur very 
soon.  Therefore, the government’s assessments of national security may be 
colored by its fear of the electoral response or even by calculations of 
electoral advantage.34  It is true that in most countries, including the United 
Kingdom, the protection of their nationals abroad is dependent on some 
measure of reciprocity.  However, foreign governments may also condone a 
state’s use of draconian counter-terrorism measures against their own 
nationals if the foreign governments themselves are domestically applying 
similar measures against this same group of perceived terrorists.  Therefore, 
as Professor de Londras rightly observed, the analyses of Posner and 
Vermeule do not properly take into account “either the historical patterns of 
expansionism in counter-terrorist laws and policies or the ballot-box effect 
of a traumatised, panicked and collectively victimised populace”35 during 
emergencies. 
Thirdly, executive unilateralists tend to give short shrift to the very 
real possibility that governments rarely relinquish the emergency powers 
that they have been conferred, even after the crisis in question has waned or 
abated.36  It is one thing to acknowledge that there is a liberty-security trade-
off that one must accept in a time of crisis; it is another thing altogether to 
sustain the executive’s use of such emergency powers indefinitely.  If courts 
were to never scrutinize governmental claims on national security, the 
(supposed) emergency may never come to a close.  Substantive research into 
the use of emergency powers globally has always shown that such 
extraordinary powers persist, and they are rarely “short term appearances on 
the legal landscape of states.”37  Their endurance or permanent entrenchment 
will spell the end and dissolve the rule of law on which these extraordinary 
measures were justified.38 
Therefore, while the executive unilateralists are not wrong in 
emphasizing that the judiciary is institutionally less equipped than the 
executive branch to acquire and process national security information, these 
scholars give too little credence to the very real risks of bias when the 
executive engages in national security determinations. 
                                                      
34  See Metcalfe, supra note 10, at 178. 
35  See DE LONDRAS, supra note 9, at 225.  
36  See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 8; see Yoo, supra note 21. 
37  Fionnuala Ni Aoláin, Terror Conflated, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 131, 134 (2008). 
38  Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION AT 
WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 45, 45 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005). 
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Civil libertarians, on the other hand, present a dismal view of the 
governmental use of national security measures during national emergencies.  
Professor David Feldman has emphasized that it is important to subject the 
security of the police and the security service on risk levels to “searching 
examination.”39  Public bodies generally do not want to face the public 
obloquy and legal liabilities that might follow from various terror-related 
events.  In turn they would have every incentive to overestimate security 
risks and be overly defensive in their responses to them.40 
In the same vein, Professor Fiona de Londras has been extremely 
sanguine about the judiciary’s capacity to review security-related laws and 
policies.41  According to de Londras, the sensitive nature of national security 
secrets should not pose a barrier to judicial review because mechanisms can 
be developed to allow for their careful, considered release to the courts.42  In 
the United Kingdom, this has taken the form of Special Advocates, who 
have some access to such confidential information and may make pleadings 
on behalf of suspected terrorists, subject to control orders issued under the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.43  Furthermore, de Londras considers that 
arguments concerning the limited institutional competence of courts are 
simply fallacious; judges constantly make legal decisions on matters they 
have little expertise on, such as medical treatment, tax arrangements, and the 
environment.44  There is therefore no reason why the judiciary is incapable 
of doing the same on security matters.45 
The civil libertarians usually strengthen their case for robust judicial 
review by pointing to the spectacular debacles of the executive’s national 
security determinations—e.g., the failure to uncover weapons of mass 
destruction in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the wrongful killing of Jean 
Charles de Menezes by the police in the London Underground.  They also 
point out that judicial deference during many periods of major national 
security emergencies has only led to the continuous and unnecessary 
repression of minorities—e.g., the internment of Japanese Americans46 or 
the detention of alleged Nazi sympathizers during World War II.47 
                                                      
39  See Feldman, supra note 5, at 379. 
40  Id. 
41  See Fiona de Londras, Guantanamo Bay: Towards Legality?, 71 MOD. L. REV. 36 (2008). 
42  See id. 
43  Aileen Kavanagh, Special Advocates, Control Orders and the Right to a Fair Trial 73(5) MOD. L. 
REV. 824, 838 (2010). 
44  See de Londras, supra note 41, at 50-51. 
45  Id. 
46  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).    
47  Liversidge v. Anderson, [1941] UKHL 1, [1942] A.C. 206 (H.L.).     
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One must also note that the civil libertarians’ claims are often tainted 
with “hindsight bias.”48  Once a national emergency has abated, or where 
new information is revealed, the judicial deference displayed by courts can 
be easily characterized as unjustified ex post.49  But when judges are ex ante 
confronted with an emergency, and where they are operating under 
conditions of epistemic uncertainty as to the outcome of the war and the 
necessity of the impugned security measures in meeting a particular national 
security threat, it is unfair to review their actions though the lens of calmer 
times.50  As Professor Mark Tushnet has astutely observed, the “glow of 
success reflects backward and affects our evaluations.”51 
Civil libertarians may point to specific monumental failures of the 
executive, but they have not demonstrated how judges generally, vis-à-vis 
the executive, are better at acquiring, processing, and evaluating national 
security information.  De Londras, as discussed above, may argue that courts 
routinely deal with matters that they are not experts of, which may well be 
true; however, assessing national security is qualitatively different from 
determining culpability in medical malpractice or environmental claims.  
Determinations made in the national security arena are usually anticipatory; 
they are based on risk-assessments and factual predictions of what people 
might or might not do in the future.52  Such disputes are unlike claims in 
torts or contracts, complicated as they maybe, where judges are assessing 
liability for past actions.  This is not to say that generalist judges never 
engage in anticipatory assessments in their daily routine.  However, 
predictive appraisals in the realm of family law, and the scale of adverse 
consequences that may follow from judicial errors, make such decisions 
qualitatively different from the specialized nature of national security 
determinations; the former task is more within the ken of generalist judges 
on the Court. 
Furthermore, national security information is often derived from 
classified sources.  The government may reasonably fear that the disclosure 
of such evidence in litigation will adversely affect its ability to use it in the 
future, thereby compromising the flow of valuable counter-terrorism 
intelligence. 53   This argument is not based on a fanciful, imaginary 
projection of some right-wing zealot, but is actually premised on the realities 
                                                      
48  See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 8, at 147. 
49  Id. at 44.   
50  Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu? Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, in THE 
CONSTITUTION AT WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 125, 125 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005).   
51  Id. 
52  See Kavanagh, supra note 20.  
53  See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009). 
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of national security.  It is now known that as a consequence of Omar Abdel-
Rahman’s prosecution for the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the 
United States government was required to hand over a list of unindicted co-
conspirators to his defense team, which had included Osama bin Laden’s 
name.54  Within ten days of the release of this list, bin Laden was alerted to 
the fact that his involvement in the terrorist bombing had been uncovered.55 
During Ramzi Yousef’s trial for the same bombing, testimonial evidence 
presented in court about the delivery of a cell phone battery tipped off the 
other terrorists still at large that one of their communication links had been 
compromised.56  The government lost an extremely valuable source of 
intelligence as a consequence.57 
Civil libertarians may respond, as has De Londras, that classified, 
sensitive information may be disclosed only to Special Advocates that 
represent terrorist suspects in the “closed materials” hearings.58  This is an 
important concession, but one must note that many civil libertarians are 
highly critical of this Special Advocate “closed materials” system.59  In any 
case, within the United Kingdom, the Supreme Court has on several 
occasions refused to examine the “closed” materials, even when this 
opportunity was offered to the Law Lords.60  One does wonder whether it is 
possible for the Court to make accurate national security determinations, vis-
à-vis the executive, if it insists on adjudicating behind a veil of ignorance. 
Unfazed by the abovementioned epistemic disadvantages inherent in 
the judicial office, Cora Chan has argued that the government must always 
prove why the judiciary should defer to them on second-order grounds.61  
According to Chan, “claims of second-order expertise usually take the form 
of the government, generally, having expertise in deciding the type of issue 
in question”62—i.e., the fact that the government was usually correct in 
deciding this type of issue in the past is a reason for deference this time.  
Therefore, for Chan, second-order claims of superior expertise in national 
security can “only be validly established if the government body can adduce 
                                                      
54  See PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT 284 (2008). 
55  Id. at 284. 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  See de Londras, supra note 41, at 50. 
59  See Helen Fenwick & Gavin Phillipson, Covert Derogations and Judicial Deference: Redefining 
Liberty and Due Process Rights in Counterterrorism Law and Beyond, 56 MCGILL L. J. 863 (2011). 
60  See RB (Algeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2009] UKHL 10, [2010] 2 A.C. 
110 (H.L.). 
61  See Chan, supra note 9. 
62  See Cora Chan, Deference, Expertise and Information-Gathering Powers, 33 LEGAL STUD. 598, 
602 (2013).   
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evidence, such as its institutional features, qualifications, and past 
performance, to persuade the court that it indeed possess the said general 
expertise or useful intelligence.”63  In particular, Chan has suggested as 
follows: 
First, the government is to adduce positive evidence to show 
that the institution which it is asking the court to defer to had 
previously made correct judgments in the type of issues 
concerned and/or that its sources of information were reliable in 
the past.  The litigant then has an evidential burden to expose 
negative records of the government’s body’s credibility and 
point out the institutional problems that these blunders expose . 
. . . If the litigant can discharge its evidential burden, the 
government must then try to show that the asserted institutional 
problems exposed by past mistakes have been solved or are not 
applicable in the present case.64 
For Chan, the burden is on the government to prove this second-order 
comparative expertise on a balance of probability.65 
This argument is untenable for national security matters.  If courts 
judge the government’s comparative expertise on records that are already in 
the public domain, this stance will inevitably always disadvantage the 
government’s case, as the more compelling evidence for the government’s 
case on national security will be classified.  Alternatively, if courts compel 
the government to declassify and disclose confidential information so that it 
can meet this onerous burden of proof—e.g., sources and intelligence 
revealed by covert operations—national security will generally be 
compromised.  Chan may argue that it is not inevitable that the release of 
such secret information would jeopardize national security, but without the 
benefit of hindsight, judges would never ex ante know.  Furthermore, Chan 
is not merely asking for the government to adduce “some evidence,”66 as she 
purports to claim; she wants the State to prove its second-order comparative 
expertise on a balance of probability.67  The implications flowing from her 
bold claims are indeed breathtaking. 
More importantly, many civil libertarians, including Chan, often 
neglect the fact that, unlike judicial findings in torts or contractual disputes, 
decisions made in the realm of national security often have life and death 
                                                      
63  Chan, supra note 9, at 12. 
64  Chan, supra note 62, at 613.  
65  Chan, supra note 9, at 15.  
66  Chan, supra note 62, at 617.  
67  Chan, supra note 9, at 15. 
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consequences.  In times of national emergencies—and in view of the 
sensitive nature of (covert) security operations and the potentially grave 
consequences of hampering speedy executive action—it is prudent for the 
judiciary to respond to these conditions of epistemic uncertainty by deferring 
to the political branches of the government.  This is because courts neither 
have the requisite expertise to accurately assess the risks facing the country 
nor have the resources to address these threats.68  Deference is a rational 
choice, especially during emergencies when time is at a premium and the 
consequences of erroneously obstructing necessary security measures are 
dire for the nation. 
However, this is not to say that judges should always acquiesce to the 
government’s purported claims of a national emergency.  As the country 
moves away from a specific exigency, the courts should calibrate their 
degree of review and re-subject governmental actions to closer scrutiny.  
Logically, the national security threat that a country is under is no less 
serious immediately before a specific exigency than afterwards.  Why, then, 
should the standard of review change with time?  It changes because, when a 
crisis is fresh, time is at a premium. 69   Prudent judges, with limited 
information, would naturally defer to the government on how to respond to 
this new threat.  As time passes, judges often acquire more information, 
thereby narrowing the epistemic gap between them and the executive.70  This 
judicial re-calibration is also necessary as executive unilateralists tend to 
give short shrift to the staying power of emergencies, and opportunistic 
governmental officials have every incentive to retain these extraordinary 
powers even after the crisis has abated. 
Therefore, it falls on the independent judiciary to re-assert control 
after the emergency has waned or where previously unavailable credible 
information surfaces that makes the government’s argument for a specific 
national security measure untenable.  
III. NATIONAL SECURITY AND A VARIABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As discussed above, executive unilateralists and civil libertarians are 
viewing the national security decisions of their preferred branch of 
government through rose-tinted glasses.  They only notice the institutional 
advantages their preferred branch enjoys in national security assessments 
and fail to account for the institutional disadvantages inherent in that office. 
                                                      
68  See Kavanagh, supra note 5, at 302.  
69  POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 8, at 44.   
70  Id.   
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Fortunately, this is not the practice of the Court in the United 
Kingdom.  Since the 9/11 attacks, the Law Lords are very cognizant of their 
epistemic advantages and limitations.  They have always varied the standard 
of review that they apply vis-à-vis the executive’s national security 
determinations according to the exigency of time and the requisite 
intelligence disclosed to them. 
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman,71  the 
House of Lords unanimously ruled that the Home Secretary could deport a 
Pakistani national on the grounds that his deportation was conducive to the 
public good for national security reasons due to his association with Islamic 
terrorist groups.72  More importantly, the Law Lords emphasized that “due 
weight”73 and “proper deference”74 must be accorded to the executive’s 
determination of what would be in the interests of national security.75 
This decision has been subject to academic criticism by civil 
libertarians.76  In particular, Colin Harvey has so observed:  
To defer mainly because it is an executive decision based on the 
assessments of the national security threat is problematic . . . .  
In the national security context, the rule of law is tested, both in 
the sense of protecting individual rights and ensuring that an 
effective regulatory framework exists.  By according decisive 
weight to the views of the executive, judges are not discharging 
their responsibility to take a view on the meaning of law.  If 
courts do this, they risk abandoning one of the values of the rule 
of law: the defence of the person against arbitrary power 
through an established legal framework properly interpreted 
and applied.77 
However, what the rule of law means is contestable and can be upheld in a  
variety of ways.78  Unfortunately, Harvey and many other civil libertarians 
do not demonstrate why the judges’ first-order assessments in the national 
                                                      
71  See Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 A.C. 153. 
72  Id. at [53]. 
73  Id. at [26]. 
74  Id. at [49]. 
75  Id. at [26], [49]. 
76  See Colin Harvey, Our Responsibility to Respect the Rights of Others: Legality and Humanity, in 
GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 228 (Victor Ramraj, Michael Hor, Kent Roach & George 
Williams eds., 2012).   
77  Id.   
78  See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Homogenising Constitutions, 23 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 483 (2003).  
See also Po Jen Yap, Defending Dialogue, PUB. L. 527 (2012). 
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security context will always be the correct determination, especially in light 
of the epistemic uncertainties inherent in the adjudication of such cases. 
Fortunately, the Law Lords in Rehman were less sanguine about the 
institutional capabilities of the judiciary within the national security 
context.79  Lord Hoffmann, who wrote the leading judgment, observed: 
[I]n matters of national security, the costs of failure can be high.  
This seems to me to underline the need for the judicial arm of 
government to respect the decisions of ministers of the Crown 
on the question of whether support for terrorist activities in a 
foreign country constitutes a threat to national security.  It is not 
only that the executive has access to special information and 
expertise in these matters.  It is also that such decisions, with 
serious potential results for the community, require a legitimacy 
which can be conferred only by entrusting them to persons 
responsible to the community through the democratic process.80 
As deferential as the judiciary may have been to the executive, we 
must read Rehman in context.  This decision was handed down within a 
month of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and, as recognized by a judge as liberal as 
Lord Steyn, “the tragic events of 11 September 2001 in New York reinforce 
compellingly that no other approach is possible.”81  Without the benefit of 
any information on how vulnerable the United Kingdom was to similar 
terrorist attacks at that time, and acknowledging how salient the devastation 
of the terrorist attacks were, judicial deference would be a rational and 
reasonable response to the existing conditions of uncertainty.  Furthermore, 
one must note that the House of Lords in Rehman had not conferred upon 
the government unbridled powers to pursue whatever national security 
measure they deemed fit.  As observed by the House of Lords, the judiciary 
would still have intervened if “the decision to deport was not based on 
grounds of national security,”82 or the decision to deport was “one which no 
reasonable minister advising the Crown could in the circumstances 
reasonably have held;”83 however, both exceptions were inapplicable on the 
facts. 
The House of Lords was next confronted with the legality of a 
national security measure in the landmark decision of A & Ors v. Secretary 
                                                      
79  Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 A.C. 153 
(H.L.) [62], [26]. 
80  Id. at [62].  
81  Id. at [29].  
82  Id. at [24].  
83  Id. at [54].  
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of State for the Home Department.84  In that case, the Government had 
derogated from Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights85 
(“ECHR”) and passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,86 
which allowed for the indefinite detention without trial of suspected foreign 
terrorists.  Nine detainees subsequently challenged the legality of these 
national security measures.87  When the case came before the House of 
Lords, a majority on the nine-person panel accepted that a public emergency 
threatened the life of the nation, but they also ruled that the executive power 
to detain without trial was not “strictly required” by the emergency in 
question.88  By an eight-to-one majority, the House of Lords invalidated the 
derogation order and declared that the impugned statutory provisions were 
incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”).89 
This decision has engendered much celebration and criticism.90  A few 
civil libertarians expressed disappointment that the majority did not go far 
enough, as it deferred to the Government’s assessment that the United 
Kingdom was in a state of public emergency even in the absence of clear 
and convincing evidence.91  As Professor Adam Tomkins asked rhetorically: 
How did the House of Lords know that there was a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation?92  In the same vein, Tom Hickman 
lamented in the following terms: “Bizarrely, by his own tactical decision not 
to show his hand, the Attorney General was thus relieved from justifying his 
decision to the standard required.”93  The learned scholars were not wrong to 
raise these concerns, but a crucial question is what alternative options the 
Law Lords had.  The Attorney General expressly declined to ask the House 
of Lords to read the closed material; the SIAC had considered these 
materials and agreed that such an emergency existed.94  As observed by 
Baroness Hale in A & Ors, while unwarranted declarations of emergency are 
a familiar tool of tyranny, the Law Lords herein were considering the 
                                                      
84  A & Ors v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 
(H.L.). 
85  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 5, Apr. 11, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221.  
86  Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.). 
87  A & Ors v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 
(H.L.). 
88  Id. at [44]. 
89  Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). 
90  See Adam Tomkins, Readings of A v Secretary of State for the Home Department, PUB. L. 259 
(2005); TOM HICKMAN, PUBLIC LAW AFTER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 339 (2010). 
91  See Tomkins, supra note 90. 
92  See id. 
93  HICKMAN, supra note 90. 
94  A & Ors v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 
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“immediate aftermath”95 of the unforgettable events of 9/11.  In view of how 
recent the attacks then were, how sensitive the intelligence on which the 
national security assertions were based, and how fatal the consequences 
could have been if the House of Lords had wrongly ruled against the 
government when the crisis was still fresh, should the House of Lords have 
ruled that there was no such public emergency merely because they were not 
invited to view the closed material?  As opined by Baroness Hale: 
But any sensible court, like any sensible person, recognises the 
limits of its expertise.  Assessing the strength of a general threat 
to the life of the nation is, or should be, within the expertise of 
the Government and its advisers.  They may, as recent events 
have shown, not always get it right.  But courts too do not 
always get things right.  It would be very surprising if the courts 
were better able to make that sort of judgment than the 
Government.96 
On the other hand, some scholars have found “a trace of 
schizophrenia”97 in the majority’s position, insofar as the Law Lords had 
subsequently ruled that the national security measures taken were not strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation. 98   This view is also 
misconceived.  The Law Lords in A & Ors were fully justified to rule against 
the Government because there was clear and convincing evidence available 
that underscored the irrationality of the impugned State measures.99  Firstly, 
the Government conceded that the threat posed by international terrorism 
was not limited to foreigners; indeed almost 30 percent of the terrorist 
suspects in the year prior to the A & Ors decision had been British 
citizens.100  If measures short of detention without trial were sufficient to 
deal with the threats posed by such a significant number of British terrorist 
suspects, it should equally suffice for foreign suspects.101  More importantly, 
these foreign suspects, even if certifiably dangerous, were allowed to leave 
for other countries as near as France, where any surveillance of their actions 
                                                      
95  Id. at [226].  
96  Id. 
97  See Thomas Poole, Courts and Conditions of Uncertainty in ‘Times of Crisis’, PUB. L. 234 (2008). 
98  A & Ors v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 
(H.L.). 
99  Id. 
100  See PRIVY COUNSELLOR REVIEW COMMITTEE, ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY 
ACT 2001 REVIEW: REPORT, 2003-4, H.C. 100-I (Eng.), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/251096/100.pdf.  
101  See Tomkins, supra note 90, at 262.  
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would pose additional problems.102  This possibility seriously undermined 
the State’s case for indefinite detention.  Unlike the previous question of 
whether the United Kingdom was in a state of public emergency, the House 
of Lords herein had access to sufficient evidence to make an informed 
determination against the Government.  It is also important to note that the 
Law Lords in A & Ors did not forbid the executive from detaining terrorist 
suspects of all nationalities103 (British or otherwise) indefinitely without 
trial.  In view of the available information they had about the irrationality of 
the existing State measures, the House of Lords merely ruled against the 
Executive’s choice to only detain indefinitely foreign suspects who could 
not be deported to other countries.104  Seen under this light, the A & Ors 
decision neither encapsulated a “muscular approach”105 to human rights nor 
did it mark the beginnings of a “much belated judicial awakening.”106  A & 
Ors is in fact a careful and rational judgment where the Law Lords took 
account of its institutional deficits and ruled according to the evidence they 
had. 
The House of Lords continued to display this strand of judicial 
pragmatism in the sequel to the A & Ors decision.  In A v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department (No. 2),107 the Law Lords had to determine, inter 
alia, whether the UK courts could receive evidence which had (or could 
have) been procured by torture inflicted by foreign officials, without the 
complicity of the British authorities.108  The House unanimously held that a 
common law exclusionary rule existed that would prohibit the admission of 
this foreign torture evidence.109  However, one must examine closely what 
the Law Lords actually decided.  The Law Lords did not state that it would 
be a violation of the HRA for the government to statutorily authorize the 
reception of such evidence.  Instead, the Law Lords merely held that such 
evidence could not be judicially received “in the absence of express 
[statutory] language or necessary implication to the contrary.” 110  
                                                      
102  A & Ors v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 
(H.L.) [44]. 
103  Arguably, among all of the Law Lords in A, only Lord Scott seemed to suggest that indefinite 
detention without trial would also have not been strictly required by the public emergency, even if British 
nationals were also detained.  His Lordship opined that the Home Secretary would still have to show that 
monitoring arrangements or movement restrictions would not suffice.  Id. at [155]. 
104  Id. at [44]. 
105  See de Londras & Davis, supra note 5.  
106  Id. at 263.  
107  A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2), [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221 
(H.L.). 
108  Id. at [1]. 
109  Id. at [52]. 
110  Id. at [51].  
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Furthermore, the government remained free to arrest, search, or detain 
persons on the strength of such foreign torture evidence.111  The common 
law exclusionary rule would also not bar any judicial reliance on evidence 
that was procured by inhuman or degrading treatment, short of torture.112  
The only rift between the Law Lords in A (No. 2) was over the test to 
be applied by the courts in determining whether the foreign evidence was 
tainted by torture.113  In the end, Lord Hope’s more conservative stance 
carried the day.  The practical distinction between the majority approach 
(Lords Hope, Rodger, Carswell, and Brown) and minority position (Lords 
Bingham, Nicholls and Hoffmann) was summarized as follows: “[I]f the 
SIAC [Special Immigration Appeals Commission] is left in doubt as to 
whether the evidence was obtained [by torture], it should admit it . . . . Lord 
Bingham’s position . . . is that if it is left in doubt SIAC should exclude the 
evidence.”114 
The House of Lords’ arguably equivocating approach toward human 
rights may lead some to view the Court’s moral condemnation of torture as 
no more than the “vacuous sound of dutifully paid lip-service.”115  But one 
should examine more closely the rationale for the majority’s position before 
one casts judgment.  As observed by Lord Hope: 
The circumstances in which the information [alleged foreign 
torture evidence] was first obtained may be incapable of being 
detected at all or at least of being determined without a long and 
difficult inquiry which would not be practicable.  So it would be 
unrealistic to expect SIAC to demand that each piece of 
information be traced to its ultimate source and the 
circumstances in which it was obtained investigated so that it 
could be proved piece by piece, that it was not obtained under 
torture.  The threshold cannot be put that high.  Too often we 
have seen how the lives of innocent victims and their families 
are torn apart by terrorist outrages.  Our revulsion against 
torture . . . must not be allowed to create an insuperable barrier 
for those who are doing their honest best to protect us.116 
                                                      
111  Id. at [47].  
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115  Nathan Rasiah, A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2): Occupying the Moral 
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The judiciary neither has the institutional advantage over the British 
intelligence agencies in acquiring and verifying the source of the disputed 
evidence, nor can it compel the executive to reveal the details of its 
processes and methods of inquiries.  In light of all these epistemic conditions 
of uncertainty, it would have been foolhardy for the courts not to defer to the  
executive’s assessment of the evidence’s admissibility when judges are left 
in doubt as to whether it was obtained by foreign torture. 
Gillan, R v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis & Anor,117 
another House of Lords decision, was subject to much academic criticism.118  
In that case, the Law Lords unanimously upheld Section 44 of the Terrorism 
Act 2000,119 which provided that a senior police officer could authorize the 
use of blanket stop and search powers in a designated area if he or she 
considered it expedient for the prevention of terrorism, i.e. the police did not 
need to have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person searched was 
involved in terrorist activity.120 
Even though there were no allegations of discrimination in the 
particular stops and searches under challenge, a few Law Lords went on and 
addressed the issue of ethnic-profiling in the counter-terrorism context.121  
According to Lord Hope and Lord Brown, persons could not be stopped and 
searched merely because they appeared to be of Asian heritage; however, the 
police could rely on a person’s ethnic origin as an indicator so long as other 
factors—e.g. age and behavior—were considered too.122 
Civil libertarians, like Daniel Moeckli, accept that the prevention of 
terrorism is a legitimate governmental interest; for them the central issue 
was whether reliance on ethnic origin when determining whom to stop and 
search could be deemed a proportionate means to achieve that goal.123  In 
determining this, Moeckli observed that the following questions are 
particularly relevant:  
Does the use of ethnicity reflect specific intelligence or just 
unexamined assumptions?  Are terrorist profiles based on 
                                                      
117  Gillan, R v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis & Anor, [2006] UKHL 12, [2006] 2 A.C. 
307 (H.L.). 
118  See Daniel Moeckli, Stop and Search Under the Terrorism Act 2000: A Comment on R (Gillan) v 
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ethnic appearance accurate? . . . . Are stop and searches based 
on ethnic profiling effective?124 
While these are very valid questions, Moeckli’s subsequent criticisms 
of the Court missed the mark.  He castigated the Law Lords for not 
providing evidence in support of the alleged link between Asian appearance 
and increased likelihood of involvement in terrorist activities.  He also 
concluded that the use of such stop-and-search powers was unsuccessful 
because such stops had led to only five arrests in connection with 
terrorism.125 
With regard to the first objection, one must note that the Home Office 
offered, subject to procedural safeguards, to explore with the claimants its 
reasons for authorizing the use of stop-and-search powers, but the latter had 
rejected this offer.126  As Lord Scott observed, one could hardly expect the 
judiciary to invalidate the stop-and-search authorization on the basis of an 
alleged disproportionate nature of that response to a perceived threat of 
terrorism, without the court having had the chance to review the intelligence 
on which this assessment was based.127  This is especially true since it was 
the claimants themselves who had effectively denied the Court this 
opportunity of reviewing the material in the first place.128  Moreover, 
whether the police’s use of ethnic-profiling was justified would depend on 
the circumstances of each case, and, since discrimination was not alleged by 
the claimants, there was no need for the Court to provide a more complete 
response on the issue.  All the Court did was clarify that there was no per se 
rule against the police’s use of ethnic origin as an indicator. 
With regard to the second objection, Moeckli had wrongly assumed 
that a certain police measure was unsuccessful merely because the arrest 
rates were low.  In deciding whether these stop-and search powers are 
effective, one must not discount the deterrent value of such measures in 
preventing crime in the first place. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that this House of Lords decision was 
handed down within months of the London bombing in 2005.  When a 
terror-related crisis has just occurred, it is not irrational for courts to be more 
deferential to the executive on national security determinations, as judges do 
not have the benefit of hindsight in assessing the severity of this new 
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developing threat.  The judicial choice to defer in Gillan was especially not 
unreasonable as these searches, though annoying or distressing to the 
persons concerned, were short-lived and were “not an interference of the 
same order as, for example, an indefinite detention on undisclosed 
grounds.”129  One must note that the author is in no way trivializing the 
stigmatization and alienation certain ethnic groups may feel against law 
enforcement agents; the author’s only point herein is that the Law Lords’ 
choice in Gillan to defer on the specific facts before them was not wrong at 
law.130 
Turning to the series of “control order” cases in 2007, while some 
may lament that the House of Lords had legitimized this system in 
general, 131  one must also note that the Law Lords were careful in 
scrutinizing whether the specific curfews in question were excessive.  So 
whereas an eighteen-hour curfew was considered an unlawful deprivation of 
the controlled persons’ liberty, 132  twelve-hour 133  and fourteen-hour 134 
curfews were held not to be.  The House of Lords refused to accept that the 
absence of a realistic prospect of prosecution was a condition precedent to 
the issue of a non-derogating control order.  Nevertheless, the Court held 
that there was an implicit continuing duty on the Secretary of State to 
periodically inquire whether this prospect had increased with time, and it 
was incumbent on the Secretary to provide the police with material that 
might be relevant to any reconsideration of prosecution.135  In the same vein, 
a majority of the House of Lords in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v. MB136 also accepted that the right to a fair trial as protected 
under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights did not 
impose a per se rule against the use of closed materials, and it would be up 
to the trial judge to decide whether the fair trial requirements were met in the 
circumstances of any particular control-order proceeding.137  Central to all of 
these decisions was the Court’s fundamental concern about finding a 
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solution “which occupies the moral high ground but at the same time serves 
the public interest and is practicable.”138 
As time has passed since the crisis mentality gripped the nation in 
2005, one may now notice a gradual upsurge in judicial intervention.  In 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF,139 the House of Lords 
overturned its central holding in MB and held that the fair trial requirements 
would never be satisfied if the case against the controlee was based to a 
decisive degree on closed materials, regardless of how cogent these closed 
materials were.140  This judicial change of mind in 2009 largely hinged on 
two main factors: (1) in AF, for the first time in public, the House of Lords 
had the benefit of full submissions by the special advocates about the 
operations of closed control order hearing, and it was revealed that even the 
special advocates had very limited informational access to these closed 
materials; and (2) the Grand Chamber in A v. United Kingdom141 had since 
ruled that the fair trial requirements would be violated in circumstances 
where the case against the controlled person was primarily based on closed 
materials.142  As the Court receives new and more complete information 
about how a control order proceeding is conducted, and as the country 
continues to remain free from new attacks on British soil, the Court, with the 
passage of time, rightly recalibrates its intensity of review over executive 
action in such matters. 
It is thus unsurprising that by 2010, the Supreme Court, in Secretary 
of State for the Home Department v. AP,143 was ready to rule against a 
sixteen-hour curfew on a controlled person, coupled with an order of forced 
relocation to an address 150 miles from his family.144  By then, the Court 
was also less prepared to accept at face value the Secretary’s claim that 
forced relocation was the only way of reducing the chances of the controlled 
person’s contact with his associates who may be Islamic extremists,145 given 
that other options were not explored and because of the profound impact 
such social isolation had on the individual.146  Even then, the Court has been 
equally cautious not to extend the AF principle to all statutorily authorized 
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“closed” material procedures (“CMPs”).147  In Tariq v. Home Office,148 the 
Supreme Court refused to impose an absolute requirement that the claimant, 
an immigration officer who was dismissed after his security clearance was 
withdrawn for national security reasons, be personally informed of the 
allegations made against him in sufficient detail when he sued the State 
before the Employment Tribunal, which had been statutorily authorized to 
use CMPs.149  Unlike in AF, the Court in Tariq noted that the applicant was 
not faced with the prospect of severe restrictions on his personal liberty 
(unlike the claimants in A & Ors), as he was merely seeking damages 
against the State in a civil suit on discrimination.150  The Court thus 
preferred to tilt the balance in favor of preserving the integrity of the security 
vetting process and protecting the State from potentially costly 
unmeritorious claims.151 
Similarly, in the early years following the London bombing, the 
House of Lords was prepared to subject foreign terror suspects that were 
being deported to non-Member States of the Convention to lower standards 
of human rights protection.  This is because the Court did not want to be “in 
the position to regulate the conduct of trials in the foreign countries from 
which aliens come and to which they may have to be deported.”152  It is 
evident that the Law Lords, in light of the epistemic uncertainties we 
discussed earlier, were deferring to the State’s determination that these 
foreign nationals were national security threats and should be removed.153   
By 2012, the Supreme Court was ready to secure a fairer hearing for 
such suspects before they were deported.154  In W (Algeria) v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department,155 the Supreme Court held that, in order for 
courts to obtain all information needed to make a correct determination, 
SIAC could make an absolute and irreversible order of non-disclosure, 
prohibiting the Secretary of State from ever revealing the evidence or 
identity of a witness called by the applicant resisting deportation on the 
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ground that the witness would be treated poorly back home. 156   But 
notwithstanding this laudable act of judicial moderation, pragmatism equally 
prevailed as the Court decided that such orders should be sparingly granted 
and that the Secretary, for national security reasons, may also seek to obtain 
a waiver from the non-disclosure order.157  In a concurring opinion, Lord 
Dyson also emphasized that such a non-disclosure order would unlikely be 
granted in circumstances where breaches of other articles of the Convention 
that are perceived to be less fundamental in nature—e.g. the right to family 
life158—are alleged.159 
This judicial sensitivity to national security considerations is most 
pronounced in disputes where the Court is asked to review the conduct of the 
government in the battlefield.  In Secretary of State for Defence v. Al-Skeini 
& Ors,160 the House of Lords held that five Iraqi applicants, who were 
allegedly killed by British troops on patrol in the U.K.-occupied territory of 
Basra, could not bring a Convention161 claim against the British government 
because Basra was not within Britain’s effective control for the applicants to 
be within the jurisdiction of the U.K.162  In particular, Lord Rodger, who 
wrote the leading judgment, accepted the evidence of senior British officers 
on the ground that “the available British troops faced formidable difficulties 
due to terrorist activity, the volatile situation and the lack of any effective 
Iraqi security forces.”163  Nevertheless, the Court accepted that a sixth 
applicant, who was killed in a U.K. military detention facility in Basra, was 
within the UK’s jurisdiction.164  One must note that this jurisdictional point 
was first conceded by the government.165  As astutely observed by Marko 
Milanovic, this case underscored the tensions in the policy considerations 
underpinning the law: the House of Lords did not want to open the 
floodgates of litigation by micromanaging the use of force in the battlefield; 
however, no national security concerns justified the killing of a defenseless 
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prisoner detained in a British facility.166  In the same vein, in Al-Jedda v. 
Secretary of State for Defence,167 the House of Lords accepted that the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1546 could qualify a detainee’s Convention 
rights.168  Professor Kent Roach has since expressed concern that the House 
of Lords allowed the Security Council Resolution to displace human rights 
obligations in the Convention;169 however, the Law Lords’ ruling was in fact 
more minimalistic and narrower than Roach had perceived it to be.  As 
observed by Lord Bingham—who wrote the leading judgment—the 
Resolution authorized the UK government to lawfully detain persons, where 
it was necessary, for imperative reasons of security, but their Convention 
rights could not be “infringed to any greater extent than is inherent in such 
detention.”170  Their Lordships were silent on whether the specific detention 
in question was no more than necessary.171  The judicial choice to reserve 
judgment on this important issue was most emphatically underscored by 
Baroness Hale in the following terms: 
We have devoted little attention to the precise scope of the 
authorisation.  There must still be room for argument about 
what is precisely covered by the resolution and whether it 
applies on the facts of this case.  Quite how that is to be done 
remains for decision in the other proceedings.172 
In the same vein, the House of Lords in R (Gentle) v. The Prime Minister173 
unanimously rejected the argument that the right to life as protected under 
Article 2 of the Convention imposed a duty on the State to take timely steps 
to obtain reliable legal advice before committing its troops to armed 
conflicts overseas.174  In particular, Lord Bingham, who wrote the leading 
judgment, emphasized as follows: “Thus the restraint traditionally shown by 
the courts in ruling on what has been called high policy—peace and war, the 
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making of treaties, the conduct of foreign relations—does tend to militate 
against the existence of the right.”175 
As the national security emergency wanes with time, like the control-
order disputes, the Court has become comparatively more assertive vis-à-vis 
the executive.176  In Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs v. Yunus Rahmatullah,177 the Supreme Court unanimously held in 
late 2012 that the British government was required to request the return of 
Rahmatullah, a Pakistani captured by British forces in Iraq, from the 
Americans, who had transferred him to Afghanistan without the United 
Kingdom’s approval. 178   Interestingly, the Court did not consider this 
intervention as a form of judicial intrusion into foreign affairs.  Instead, Lord 
Kerr, who wrote the leading judgment, observed that the grant of habeas 
corpus did not require the British government “to act in any particular way 
in order to demonstrate whether they could or could not exert control”179 
over Rahmatullah, as the government was merely required to establish 
whether such control existed in fact.180  However, as Professor Kent Roach 
has pointed out, this argument is unconvincing, as the only realistic way for 
the United Kingdom to establish whether it had effective control over 
Rahmatullah was for the courts to actively require the British government to 
request the United States to return him to U.K. custody.181  Nevertheless, by 
a five-to-two majority, the Court refused to further review the adequacy of 
Britain’s subsequent diplomatic moves and accepted that the U.K. 
government had made a bona fide—albeit unsuccessful—attempt to secure 
Rahmatullah’s return from the United States.182  While some critics may 
lament that the light of the rule of law has not penetrated far enough into the 
dark and murky waters of national security, 183  one must concede that 
Rahmatullah is ground-breaking so far as the Court has indeed treaded into 
the traditionally forbidden terrains of foreign relations. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 In the foregoing analysis, this article attempts to account for why the 
Court has been seemingly inconsistent on national security policy.  In 
essence, the Court, like all other appellate courts, is cognizant of the 
institutional advantages and disadvantages of its office.184  While the Court 
understands that it has the advantage of independence from the immediate 
political environment, which makes it less likely to be biased against 
unpopular claimants, this insulation also poses an institutional problem for 
the Court.  The judiciary is limited by its access to the information possessed 
by the executive and an under-appreciation of the interlocking consequences 
of individual decisions, as well as its inability to react swiftly to changing 
circumstances.185  This institutional dilemma is inherent in all disputes, but it 
is particularly heightened in national security controversies, where the 
consequences of any judicial errors can be catastrophic for the nation. 
Critics of judicial deference in times of war often frame the problem 
as a character failing (i.e. judges need to have more courage), but in truth, 
there are deeper institutional reasons for deference that consistently lead 
judges to define their roles in specific ways during times of crisis.186  On the 
other hand, executive unilateralists overvalue the informational handicap of 
the courts and pay insufficient credence to the incentives the executive has 
in prolonging the length of an emergency measure or exaggerating its 
necessity.  In reality, the Court has avoided either extreme position.187  When 
a new emergency surfaces, judges defer, as they are aware that the stakes are 
high and their information limited; this need to defer diminishes when the 
observable events giving rise to the crisis recedes and the Court obtains 
more information that narrows the epistemic gap between the judiciary and 
the executive.188  Therefore, in practice, the Court is neither “awestruck by 
the mantra of national security,”189 nor is it oblivious to the dangers of 
applying no deference in the review of national security disputes. 
In the final analysis, the false belief that either the legislature or the 
judiciary may singularly and sufficiently defend the constitutional values of 
a society imposes a burden that neither branch of government can bear.190  It 
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sets up unrealistic expectations that only invite disappointments or, worse, 
court disasters.191  Constitutional interpretation relies on “judgment, not 
algorithm; it requires judicial self-discipline, located within a particular 
community’s interpretive traditions, and [is] based on an appreciation for the 
limited but important role of judges in a democracy.”192  In seeking to meet 
the evolving challenges of national security while protecting the 
fundamental values of a civilized society, the Court must continue to weave 
this legal narrative that conjoins the best in both administration and 
adjudication. 
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